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Logic and psychology overlap in judgment, inference and proof. The
problems raised by this commonality are notoriously difficult, both
from a historical and from a philosophical point of view. Sundholm
has for a long time addressed these issues. His beautiful piece of
work [Sundholm(2002)] begins by summarizing the main difficulty in
the usual provocative manner of the author: one can start, he says, by
the act of knowledge to go to the object, as the Idealist does; one can
also start by the object to go to the act, in the Realist mood; never the
two shall meet. He is himself inclined to accept the first perspective
as the right one and he has eventually developed an original version
of antirealism which starts, not from considerations about the pub-
licity of meaning, in the manner of Dummett, but from an epistemic
standpoint, trying to search in a non-Fregean tradition of analysis of
judgement and cognate notions a way of founding constructivist se-
mantics. The present paper ploughes the same field. We concentrate
on the significance, for Sundholm’s program, of the perspective that
has been opened by Twardowski in his important essay on acts and
products [Twardowski(1912a)].
1 Problems for logic in the intentionalist
framework
Judgment can be conceived from two different standpoints: the subjec-
tive perspective that takes it as an actual episode in the mental life of
the judger, and the objective perspective that considers it as related to
real or ideal entities whose conformation makes the judgment correct
or wrong in a determinate way.
On the objectivist side, one finds philosophers - Frege could be
taken as a paragon of this view - who claim that, to make logic ob-
jective, there is no other means than to extrude from the mind the
contents of the judgements and to consider them as stable and mind-
independent entities. Dummett has convincingly shown that this anti-
psychologist move, in its original Fregean form, leads to an ’ontological
mythology’ [Dummett(1996), 25] - one would like to say an ’epistemo-
logical mythology’ too: by extruding thoughts from the mind, one has
to assume that they populate a ’third realm’ of reality, distinct of both
the physical and the mental worlds, and one has therefore to solve the
new problem that springs up in this way, namely that of explaining how
we could cognitively access to these thoughts. According to Dummett,
the ’linguistic turn’ of philosophy, which is to him the characteristic
mark of analytic philosophy, just results from the need of providing a
version of anti-psychologism that were free of these mythologies and
oddities. The intercalation of words and sentences between the judger
and the contents of her judgments preserves the objectivity of judge-
ment while avoiding mythology, by locating meanings outside the mind
but firmly in the spatio-temporel world:
One in this position has therefore to look about him and to
find and to find something non-mythological but objective
and external to the individual mind to embody the thoughts
which the individual subject grasp and may assent to or re-
ject. Where better to find it than in the institution of a com-
mon language ? (loc. cit.)
This interpretation of the linguistic turn, as well as the question whether
it should be considered as characteristic of analytical philosophy, have
been much discussed in recent philosophical literature, and we will
leave it untouched. Rather, our aim is to discuss a similar inflection
that the partisans of the subjective approach of judgment have en-
visaged at the same time to solve symmetric problems raised by the
primitive formulation of their theory, to examine the reasons why they
eventually renounce to such a linguistic turn, and to argue that they
were right in doing so.
The starting point of the subjectivist conception of judgment is a gen-
eral analysis of mental life, which simply conceives judgment as one
of the moods, inter alia, of intentionality, beside presentation (Vorstel-
lung), emotion, volition and so on. Judgment enjoys no privilege at all:
conscious presentation of something is taken as the basic intentional
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relation, and judgment is said to follow just the same way as other
conscious activities. In the most often quoted passage of his writings,
Brentano expresses the point as follows:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scho-
lastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental)
inexistence (Inexistenz) of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, relationship (Beziehung)
to a content (Inhalt), direction toward an object (which is not
here to be understood as meaning a reality (Realität)), or im-
manente objectity (Gegenständlichkeit). Every mental phe-
nomenon includes (enthält) something as an object within
itself, although they not all do so in the same way. In pre-
sentation something is presented, in judgment something is
asserted (anerkannt) or rejected (verworfen), in love loved, in
the hate hated, in desire desired and so on [Brentano(1995),
88].1
In the Brentanian perspective, propositional attitudes (e.g. judgments)
are therefore treated in the same way as non-propositional attitudes as
love or hate and the last ones are taken as fundamental [Brandl(1996),
263]. The objects of the judgments are considered as no more struc-
tured than the intentional objects involved in other mental phenom-
ena. As a consequence, judgments can even no longer be viewed, in
the Aristotelian mood, as referring to conglomerates of elements as
subjects and predicates: to Brentano, every judgment is judgment of
existence. According to the "ideogenic" theory he defended, the ob-
ject of a judgment is always a single thing the existence of which is
affirmed or denied (e.g. when someone is judging that S is P she is
actually judging that some S that is P exists): the whole judgment con-
sists in the approval (or denial) of the existence of the presentation
you have:
It can be shown with utmost clarity that every categorical
proposition can be translated without any change of mean-
ing into an existential proposition, and in that event the "is"
or "is not" of the existential proposition takes the place of
the copula.
I want to prove this with some examples.
1 The translation of Beziehung by "reference", as in the English edition quoted, is
misleading; "relationship" should be definitely preferred.
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(...) The categorical proposition "No stone is living" means
the same as the existential proposition "A living stone does
not exist" or "There is no living stone" [Brentano(1995), 213-
214].
This intentionalist perspective on judgment poses two kinds of prob-
lems for logic: the question of the unstructuredness of their contents
- judgment is just affirmation or denial of a single presentation -, and
the question of their volatility, namely that of their confinement in the
episodes of the mental life of individual subjects.
1.1 Lack of structure
Logic and psychology jointly contribute to the analysis of judgment.
According to a widely shared consensus, psychology deals with the
mental act of judging, while logic primarily deals with the content of
judgment, and with the act only in an indirect way. Logical constants
(negation, conjunction, etc) belong to the content and give him its logi-
cal structure. The first duty of logic is to tell, given this structure, what
the truth-value of the whole content is, supposed already known the
truth-values of the constituent parts that are articulated in the struc-
ture. As a second duty, logic has, of course, to tell also which judg-
ments are correct, but this second task is a trivial by-product of the
first one: a judgment will be considered as correct if it consists in the
assertion of a true content or in the denial of a false content, and as
incorrect in the other cases. That amounts to say that, should be no
logical structure in the content of judgments, logic would have nothing
to say about judgments. To logicians, the first, formidable, difficulty
of the intentionalist approach of judgment it this: as intentionalists
consider the contents of judgments as simple and devoid of any logi-
cal structure, they have nothing to do but keep mute about judgment
if the intentionalist is right.
This worrying situation could have been a motive, for logic-minded
intentionalists, to bring some changes in Brentanian credo in putting
forward, in a way or in another, structured entities - linguistic contents
- that were intimately associated to the judging-acts.
One has however to be careful about the exact nature of the problem
for which a solution was sought by intentionalists. It has been some-
times said, [Field(1978), 9 sq] being the locus classicus in this respect,
that ’Brentano’s problem’ consisted in explaining intentionality - taken
as a relation of the subject to propositions, as it is apparently the case
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in belief, desire and other mental states - in a naturalistic frame. In
other words, Brentano is interpreted as having raised, and declared to
be unsolvable in a materialist setting, the question how it is possible,
to a bodily creature, to be related to a certain object while no causal
transaction between the creature and the objects can be plausibly en-
visaged as a support or conveyor for the relation. To this enigma, a
familar scheme of answer consists in decomposing the intentional re-
lation (let us say x’s belief that A) into two different parts. The first one
relates x to a token of a sentence p meaning that A - this first relation
is innocuous from a naturalist standpoint, as both relata are physical
entities (e.g. x is ready to sincerely and overtly assent to p when suit-
ably interrogated, or x has some neural code for p in her belief-box, or
something else) -, and the second one relates the sentence-type p to its
meaning, namely the proposition that A. This second relation is taken
as as naturalistically innocent as the first one, for it amounts to the
familiar relation of linguistic meaning that connects words and things
in absence of any physical relation relating them. In short, one solves
the intentionality enigma in putting all the weight of the problem on
the allegedly unproblematic relation of linguistic meaning. Words, as
it were, are in charge of the travel.
For several reasons, this ’linguistic turn’ has never been seriously
envisaged in the intentionalist tradition. First, one has to keep in
mind the deep difference between contemporary analytic philosophy
of knowledge and mind, and the scene where Brentano, Twardowski
and others were playing: as it has been convincingly shown by [Haldane(1989)],
the intentionalist tradition was not at all interested in the contempo-
rary ’enigma’ of the incorporation of intentional mental states into a
physicalist account of the world. Second, the basic items of intention-
alist conception are things we do or perform - mental acts -, not things
we have or live in - mental states. This utterly different conception
is much less suitable for a ’linguistic turn’ in the way Field envisages.
Third, Brentano never assumed any strong correspondence between
acts of judging and sentences that might be intimate to them. He de-
fends a non-propositional theory according to which, it is sufficient,
for two judgments being the same, that their matter (the presenta-
tion involved in them) and their form (affirmative or positive) are the
same. Nothing linguistic at all is involved in these identity conditions.
Moreover, he considers that linguistic utterances - including ’inner’ ut-
terances in the silent speech of the judger - are not compulsory ingre-
dients of judging acts for another reason yet, namely that, to him, a
judging activity can be performed even in the absence of conceptual
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content, as for example when we accept a perceptual experience of
something cyan, while we do not possess or do not apply the concept
of ’cyan’, or when we express our acknowledging of a painful experi-
ence by simply crying rather than in an articulate way. Four and not
least, intentionalists were well-conscious of the necessity of making
room for logic in the analysis of judgment, and therefore of taking it
as equipped with a logical structure but, as we are going to develop in
the last part of this paper, they considered that this structure should
be put on the act-side, not on the content-side.
1.2 Volatility
Intentional existence, or rather inexistence, existence in the improper
(nicht wirklich) sense, is as transitory and personal as the mental acts
that host it. The objects to which mental acts refer to just inhabit
(einwohnen) the individual mind while it acts so and so, and judgment
does not make an exception to this rule. What could be added to that?
Brentano was not at all interested in the question of the ’ontological
status’ of intentional objects (an expression that he, incidentally, did
not use very often), but he became more and more concerned with an
misinterpretation of his doctrine in terms of ’entia rationis’ - his phrase
for Platonic entities - and eventually decided to cut short this reading,
which he considered as parasitic and mistaken.
An appealing strategy, to deal with a problematic relatum of a re-
lation, is adverbialization: one ceases to consider the suspect as a ge-
nuine relatum, and one transforms it into a mere modifier of the re-
lation, which has therefore one argument less than before. In another
context, speaking of propositional attitudes instead of judgments, Quine
has envisaged favorably this strategy in a well-known passage of Word
and Object. After having canvassed various construals of belief-objects,
he writes:
A final alternative I find as appealing as any is simply to dis-
pense with the objects of the propositional attitudes. We
can continue to formulate (...) the propositional attitudes
with the help of the notations of intensional abstraction (...)
but just cease to see these notations as singular terms re-
ferring ot objects.This means viewing "Tom believes [Cicero
denounced Catiline]", no longer as of the form ’Fab’ with a
= Tom and b = [Cicero denounced Cataline], but rather of the
form ’Fa’ with ’a = Tom and complex ’F ’.[Quine(1964), 216]
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Brentano made a similar move at the end of his carreer, when he pro-
posed a purely adverbial theory of judgment - as well as of mental acts
and life in general -, in which the question of the ontological status
of intentional objects was radically emptied of any sense: to mentally
refer to an object ω eventually became an accidental and transitory
monadic state of the subject, a ’ω-thinking’, comparable in this regard
to a ’sitting’ or to a ’singing’. The price for such an adverbialization is
high. First, by making the contents of judgment mute, one endangers
the architecture of cognitive life: the judgment that Not A - more ex-
actly, the judgment that the man in the street calls in this way - should
be more, and more specifically, related to the judgment that A than
sitting and singing are related. Second, one fails to see, in absence
of stable relata, what the identity conditions of judgments could be,
and what the guarantee that judgments could be made another time
by the same individual on another occasion, a fortiori how they could
be made, with certainty of dealing with the same judgment, by another
individual. Now, such iterability and sharability seem mandatory for
argumentation, rational discussion, and logic. How to conceive indi-
vidual and dated acts of judging as token of judgment-types that can
be realized by other tokens, in other circumstances or by other indi-
viduals ? Here again, there could have been another motive, for the
intentionalist tradition, to make adopt a ’linguistic turn’.
Roughly expressed, the stabilization problem is this. Brentano-style
psychology has to do with instantaneous acts of mind, while logic is,
prima facie, concerned with more stable items. Should this last as-
sumption - logic has necessary to do with something stable - be taken
as granted, the development of a logic in accordance to the intentional-
ist principles ought to overcome the momentariness of mental acts by
proposing a conception that associates to them stable entities. This
stabilization can be sought in two directions, either in considering
mental acts as intermittent effects of stable dispositions, or in con-
sidering them, or their products, as tokens of general types. Let us
consider these two strategies in turn.
The dispositionalist strategy, all things considered, is hardly rele-
vant to the intentionalist case. For, either we take ’disposition’ in a
weakly causal sense, alluding to the fact that the mental life should en-
joy some minimal stability - once a first judgment has been performed,
it is uncommon that the judger randomly deviates -, or we take it in
a strongly causal acception, which has to do with a direct explanation
of series of transitory judging-acts by deeper and more stable doxastic
propensities that were just revealed by the acts they cause. Disposi-
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tions, weakly conceived, are of few use: they leave us just with the
question we are dealing with, namely that of giving sense to the idea
of the repetition of a judgment. As regards the strong sense, which
amounts to consider human beings, as it were, as driven to judge in-
termittently but repeatedly in the same way by an underlying force, as
radio-active nucleus are bound to lose energy by periodically emitting
ionizing particles, it does not the job, either for the analogy rests on
a mistake. Propensity to radio-active decay gives raise, at each time of
its actualization, to a particle emission from which a punctual decay of
radio-activity actually results. Contrastingly, propensity to associate
presentations - which is the way dispositionalist theorists (Hume, Bain,
Mill, ... ) conceive dispositional beliefs - simply does not result in judg-
ing acts, but rather in actual linkages between presentations, what is
throughly distinct [Brentano(1995), II, VII, §2].2 Thus, dispositional be-
liefs, because they are not dispositions to judge, are not a suitable way
of stabilizing judging acts.
The other strategy for stabilizing judging-acts, namely by consider-
ing them as tokens of some types, looks much more promising, but it
has to overcome a certain number of difficulties:
a) As the most attested and apparently unproblematic range of ap-
plication of the pair type/token is the domain of linguistic items
(grosso modo, there is no insuperable difficulty in asserting that
there are two tokens of the type ’there’ that are enclosed in this
parenthesis), there is a strong temptation to take a ’linguistic turn’,
namely to embedd mental acts into a world of words and to define
act-types as acts directed toward sentence-types. Nonetheless, this
move is just unfaithful to one of main Brentano’s motto, namely
that phrases as ’x judges that A’ can be at most tolerated as neu-
tral, minimal and non-committing ways of speaking of mental acts,
or of reporting them, in the common idiom, but that they can never
be taken at face value, because the actual content of judging-acts is
not propositional.
b) The type/token distinction can be constructed in different ways,
which are not equivalent with respect to the scope and significance
2That is not to say, of course, that psychologists near to Brentano remain in-
different to the question of mental habits or psychological tendences. Quite at the
opposite, some of them had strong interest in these dispositions, including under
the umbrella of the physical determinants of psychic activity [Höfler(1897), §§ 12
and 25].
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of the intentionalist enterprise. On one hand, types can be con-
ceived in an ideal way as entities enjoying some ontological priority
relative to the entities that tokenize them (this priority might go so
far as to consider as possible, at least conceptually, types that were
not exemplified at all)); on the other hand, one can think of types
as merely resulting by an abstraction process from classes of actual
or potential items. Each option has its own advantages and incon-
veniences. The downward strategy is certainly more appropriate to
insure the ’purity’ of logic, while the ascending one is largely more
comfortable to guarantee that the standards of logic can be actually
met.
c) The types and tokens that are at stake in the present discussion
are classified according, not to some unproblematic equivalence re-
lation as typographic equiformity, but to equivalence relations that
present much more difficulties, as equivalence in meaning. One has
therefore to be prepared to envisage various construals of typifica-
tion, depending for example on what analysis is provided for the
very notion of meaning.
2 Intentionalist ways out
2.1 Stabilization
As said just above, various strategies of stabilization can be envisaged,
and have been in fact developed, in the intentionalist tradition.
[Husserl(1900-1901)] is often taken as having found the Holy Grail:
a whole conception of mental life, meaning and logic which meets the
opposite requirements of psychic accessibility and objective ideality
of the contents. To insure that we are speaking of the same meaning
across repeating judging acts, Husserl assumes that acts of judgment
have a transcendent ideal content beyond their immanent real one.
These ideal, timeless and non-individual contents are nevertheless con-
ceived as displaying themselves before the judger, and therefore as
able to be accessed in individual transitory acts of judgement. A de-
tailed discussion of how and whether this kind of conciliation between
logic and psychology is possible is largely beyond the scope of the
present paper. We prefer focus the discussion on the alternative ana-
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lysis presented by [Twardowski(1912a)], which differs from Husserl’s
conception on several significant points.3
After careful examination of the intricacies of the relationship be-
tween mental acts and their linguistic expression, Twardowski can-
vasses an original and detailed theory of the linguistic objectification
of judgments, which tries to prevent the mistakes that arise from indis-
criminate reliance of their public expression. He firstly considers some
wrong ways of stabilizing mental activities by means of language. The
most pernicious one, he says, lies in confounding mental acts with
their ’external’ linguistic expression, as when one equates a singular
act of judgment with the affirmative sentence that the judger is dis-
posed to utter at the same moment. The verbal utterance that some-
times accompanies the mental act is in itself unproblematic and hardly
worth of mention, as a neutral, minimal and non-committing way for
the judger of conveying some information about her own mental life in
the colloquial idiom. However, this enunciatio is often approximative
and in relaxed style, just determinate enough to put the hearer who
shares the same situation in a position of getting an idea of the act
that has been performed. The tendency of taking this sentence as a a
perfectly reliable guide to grasp the act leads to major inconveniences,
just because the reusability of the sentence does not fit with the mo-
mentariness of the act. As early as 1900, Twardowski had shown that
this mistake is at the root of the relativism of truth, namely of the doc-
trine according to which the truth-value of the judgments is subject
to variations depending on circumstances. The relativist wrongly as-
sumes, on the basis of the invariance of the linguistic by-products of
the judgments, that the judgments themselves do not vary according
to circumstances. The use of indexical terms by the judger are a typical
3 Twardowski, a pupil of Brentano, was the founder of the Polish School of phi-
losophy. He was not himself a logician in the technical sense of the term. Not to
mention Frege, he had no deep acquaintance with mathematics as, for example,
Husserl could have. While he was convinced of the importance of Brentano’s con-
tribution to logic, he renounced eventually to publish the systematic exposition he
had in mind. His manuscript [Twardowski(1924)], which contains significant devel-
opments on Brentano’s reducibility of any judgment to existential form, stopped af-
ter a striking comparison between Brentano and Bolzano. Nevertheless, Twardowski
never stop to insist, including against some of his own fellows, on the validity of
the ’ideogenic’ theory of judgments. He wrote a whole paper in 1907 to defend it,
while he recognized that he was at the time in Poland, as it were, the last of the Mo-
hicans: "Only my text adopts the idiogenetic perspective with respect to the essence
of a judgment, whereas all of the others subscribe to one of the allogenetic theories"
[Twardowski(1907), 99].
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occasion for such mistakes. The correct view is that the sentence ’It’s
raining now’ does not express the same judgment at any time. Twar-
dowski stresses that the element that varies according to the circum-
stances is not the truth-value of the judgment, which remains fixed,
but the judgment expressed by the sentence:
Although there is a very intimate connection between a judg-
ment, on the one hand, and a statement, which is the exter-
nal expression of the judgment, on the other, the statement
is nonetheless not identical with the judgment (...). The re-
lativists, however, do not take this distinction into account,
and only because of this lack of rigour are they in a position
of adduce examples of judgments which apparently support
their theory concerning the existence of relative truths (...).
In the absence of appropriate indications, or as a result of
inattentiveness, one may be misled to believe in such cases
that an invariance in the expression is accompanied by an
invariance in the product bound up to it. Upon closer exami-
nation it turns out that the invariance in the mental product
was merely illusory, and that in fact what we have is an iden-
tity of external expression for two different mental products
[Twardowski(1900), 149].4
To recover the true content of the judgments from the sentences that
are uttered on the occasion of their performance, the replacement of
the indexicals by absolute spatiotemporal coordinates is however not
sufficient. We should also grasp the whole way the judger uses the
words in these sentences and what he really intends to means by them.
To that, it is not enough to belong to the same linguistic community as
him, for the relevant notion of meaning is less that of linguistic mean-
ing than that of speaker’s meaning, namely a notion of meaning that
involves the communicative intentions of the speaker. As Twardowski
4At the time of this article, Twardowski has not yet established his distinction
between actions and products, to which [Twardowski(1912a)] is entirely devoted. In
Wartenberg’s German translation checked by Twardowski [Twardowski(1902)] the
term ’product’ is rendered by ’Tätigkeit’. Generally speaking, Twardowski was a pas-
sionate and competent philologist, attentive to cross-linguistic evidence and trying to
find the most rigorous way of expressing his philosophical views in several languages
(Polish, French, German, English). That is the reason why, to interpret his writings,
one should keep in mind all the versions and translations of his texts. The systematic
trilingual edition [Twardowski(1912b)] of his seminal work has been settled to meet
this requirement.
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notices, the cause of the fact that "the same statement can express dif-
ferent judgments is to be found (...) in the manner in which we employ
speech for expressing our judgments", as it is plainly evident by the
fact that we may indifferently answer by ’Yes ! I have’ to the two ques-
tions whether we have read Sienkiewicz’s Quo vadis and whether we
have ever been married (op. cit.,, 150).
Twardowski’s thesis is not, however, that some judgments might
be properly ineffable. The external expression of judgment is indeed
in most cases able to "accomplish its objective perfectly in colloquial
speech", for the resulting statements are generally intelligible to those
around the speaker, since "the circumstancies accompanying the spea-
ker’s words fill in for what the words do not express" (loc. cit.). But
his analysis shows that the recourse to the very sentences uttered by
the speaker can be hardly considered as a suitable way to stabilize the
content of his mental acts beyond the particular circumstances of its
performance, for thoroughly different judgments may be expressed by
the same words. Linguistic utterances are a reliable guide toward the
mental activity of the speaker only insofar as the hearer shares the
same communicative situation. For other people, especially for remote
readers, the quotational report of theses utterances is of few help to
decide with certainty what mental act has been performed. Thus, the
worst way of referring to a judgment is the paratactic way (’x judges:
it’s raining’): by the very nature of the judgment, acts of judging cannot
be assimilated to acts of saying. This condemnation extends, a fortiori,
to the elliptic way that takes the mere enunciatio for the judgment
itself:
Some use ’judgments’ to refer to precisely that we here refer
to with ’sentence’. Prof Łukasiewicz does so, among oth-
ers, defining a judgment as a "sequence of words or other
signs which state that some object has or does not has a
particular attribute" [Łukasiewicz(1971), 497]. But in treat-
ing a judgment as a sequence of words or other signs Dr
Łukasiewicz must distinguish from this sequence of words
or other signs what constitutes its meaning. As a matter
of fact, Dr Łukasiewicz also speaks of ’meaning-equivalent
jugdments’, defining them as judgments that "express the
same thought in different words" (ibid, p. 500). Now, this
thought, expressed in those words, is obviously nothing other
than a judgment in the sense of a product of an action of
judging, thus, if the word ’judgment’ is made to serve for
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designating a "sequence of words or other signs" that ex-
press this sort of thought, an expression will then be lack-
ing for designating such a thought [Twardowski(1912a), 129-
130, fn. 56].
The problem raised by Twardowski goes far beyond of the ’practical’
difficulty of recovering the thought from the linguistic sentence that
accompanies its appearance, or even the ’conceptual’ problem of in-
troducing a suitable distinction between the sentence and the thought.
It lies in the fact that, if one explains or individuates a thought by a
certain relationship to the meaning of a sentence p, one will be also
committed to explain the secondary thought that the sentence p has
just the right meaning, or that the utterance of p is just the most suit-
able, in context, to guide the hearer to the content of the primitive
thought.
Twardowski’s gives to his decoupling of the acts of judgment from
their linguistic externalisation an original form by means of his distinc-
tion between activities (czynnos´ciach) and products (wytworach). He
claims that the statements that accompany judging acts cannot be con-
sidered as their result or products - these products are the judgments
themselves -, but rather as derived ’psychophysical’ products, namely
as the products of a concomitant physical activity (e.g. in the case of a
lying act, the psychical product is the lie and the psychophysical pro-
duct it the sentence that has been insincerely uttered). After quoting
approbatively Bergmann, who stresses the transitoriness and the mo-
mentariness of the products of the judging activity5, he states in clear
terms the stabilization problem
To be sure, we also say that certain beliefs have persisted
through the ages, and that the thoughts of a sage can out-
live him. But in these cases the issue is not the continued
actual existence of products independent of the actions that
produced them; it is, rather, a matter of repeating through a
succession of generations actions and products that are sim-
ilar to those that have occurred in preceding generations, or
in that sage. (...) Hence, when we speak on the enduring ex-
istence of products of this sort, it is either a matter of the
same kind of actions and products repeating themselves, or
of their potential existence (op. cit., 116).
5"The judgment (Urteil) is what emerges simultaneously with the judging
(Urteilen), and is the immediately vanishing product of the later" [Bergmann(1879),
38].
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In other words, the judgments produced by judging-acts are not more
enduring as these acts: generally speaking, "there is (...) no place for
mental products within the domain of enduring products" (op. cit.,
119). Some momentary acts, of course, generate enduring products,
in such a way that these products are ontologically distinct of the acts
that give birth to them. The act of building a house, for example, be-
longs to this category, for the house persists in existing beyond the
end of the building act. Not so, however, for mental acts as judgments,
whose products instantaneously vanish and cannot survive, except by
being regenerated and brought into renewed existence by new mental
acts of the same kind. To achieve this process in another way than by
mere coincidence, language is required. For the linguistic by-products
that usually accompany the judgmental activities can continue to ex-
ist long after the judging-acts that correspond them if their physical
substratum is suitable for that, for example if they consist in written
words. That does not mean, however, that these words are the fixed
content of the judgments considered. As there is no mental endurance
beyond renewal of similar mental activity, these words have a mere
rôle of stabilizers, which is actually played only in the case where they
are read, understood and taken as the support and occasion of a new
act of the same type, by the same judger who remembers her previous
act in this way and iterates it, or by another judger who is lead in this
way to consider the presentation involved in the original judgment and
to assent it once again on her side:
The issue is not the continued actual existence of products
independent of the actions that produced them; it is, rather,
a matter of repeating through a succession of generations
actions and products that are similar to those that have oc-
curred in preceding generations, or in that sage (...). When we
speak of the enduring existence of products of this sort, it
is, either a matter of the same kind of actions and products
repeating themselves, or of their potential existence.6 It is
indeed for this reason that these products may be termed
non-enduring, namely, in the sense that they do not endure
6This potentiality may be conceived within the broadest possible scope, as when
we speak, say, of the ’existence’ of truths which no one knows yet, i.e. of the ’exis-
tence’ of true judgments that no one has ever passed. Obviously, what is involved
here is the capability of passing these judgments, and that which exists is not the
judgments but the capacity to pass them.
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in the mode of actual existence any longer than the action
by means of which they originate (op. cit., 116).
Judgments cannot be stabilized beyond the potential reiteration of the
judging-acts. In particular, one is not allowed to consider that stability
could be actually achieved by means of language, as if a judging-act
consisted in being transitorily related, in the mood of assent or of de-
nial, to a fixed propositional content regularly meant or designated by
a certain sentence. Quite at the opposite, in saying that a judging-act
is merely accompanied by a sentence, or creates a token of it as a mere
psychophysical by-product, Twardowski considers that the judgment
should be considered as the meaning of the sentence. This acceptation
of ’meaning’ is uneasy to grasp7, but it is certainly a modest notion, by
large not reaching as far as the Husserlian notion of ’irrevocably iden-
tifiable’ objective meaning. To Twardowski, judging-acts do not refer,
with approbative or rejective force, to sentences. In a diametrically
opposite way, it is the sentences that express, or refer to, judgments,
considered as products of judging acts:
In regard to a mental product that expresses itself in a cer-
tain psychophysical product - i.e. when that psychophysi-
cal product is an expression of the mental product - we oc-
casionally say that the psychophysical product signifies this
mental product, to wit - that the mental product is signified
by means of the psychophysical product. But we only speak
that way under quite specific circumstances, namely, when
the psychophysical product in which some mental product
expresses itself can itself become the partial cause for the
subsequent emergence of the same or a similar mental prod-
uct, and when it plays this role of a partial cause by eliciting
the same or similar mental action as that which gave rise to
the given psychophysical product (op. cit., 121).
To sum up: the sentence ’p’ means the mental product J iff it is both
uttered as a by-product of the mental act of producing J by the judger
and taken as an occasion of a similar mental act by the reader.
That characterization deserves explanation.
a) The question raised by Twardowski is not that of the effability of
thoughts, namely that whether the mental activity is capable of be-
ing suitably expressed by the sentence that means its product. For
7Cf. [Buczyn´ska-Garewicz(1977)] and [Smith(1989)]
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a psychophysical product may express, in this sense, a mental act,
without being taken as the support of a new similar act (the second
condition for meaning is compulsory). As an example, a scream ex-
presses the pain of the subject without meaning it, for it does not
give rise to a comparable pain in the hearer.
b) For the same reason, an utterance cannot be taken as a mere indi-
cation of the underlying judgment, as smoke indicates the fire that
causes it. Intimation (Kundgebung), namely the voluntary act of
making known to the others which judgment one has performed, is
not even sufficient. To mean a judgment, a sentence ought to be a
successful intimation or command, to the reader, of performing the
same judgment. This original feature of Twardowski’s conception
insures the potential convergence of the judgers without achieving
it by means of the assumption of ideal meanings or of pre-existing
contents waiting for being grasped in a way or another by different
individuals: meaning is at the very start defined by the fact that
speakers and writers should be able to evoke and provoke in their
hearers or readers mental acts that are suitably analogue to theirs
own acts. In that way, the meaning of a sentence can be characte-
rized as the equivalence class of the singular mental acts activated
in a community by its audition or reading.
c) In defining meaning in this way, Twardowski expresses a consi-
derable skepticism toward any conception that relies on language
and meaning to characterize mental activities. There is no room for
’linguistic turn’. The correct understanding of the others words is
viewed as fragile as such an extent that, to insure it, one has to de-
fine meaning in terms that already involve mutual comprehension
and possible interaction. As a surprising by-product of this view of
meaning, the linguistic expression of the judgment is pushed on the
side of illocutionary acts, which, in principle, it does not belong to.
Judgment, as usually conceived, does not make on others any com-
parable effect as promises, even in the case when the judging-act is
accompanied by the production of voiced or written items. Some-
body may be afraid by my threat of punishing her, not at any extent,
at least in a so direct way, by hearing my judgment about a related
topic. Not so in Twardowskian view, which puts the potential effi-
cacy on the mental life of others among the correctness conditions
of the utterances of the judger.
16
d) Twardowski’s road toward stabilization is bottom-up, starting from
various individual judgments to come by abstraction to a class of
similar judgments, instead of starting from hypothetical ideal con-
tents and judgments-types directed toward these contents to come
then to individual realizations which were tokenizing those ideal
types in the mental life of singular judgers. To be plainly rigorous,
this abstracting way of achieving generality should settle in clear
terms the similarity conditions of individual judgments. By the very
nature of the case, one cannot account for these conditions by in-
voking the conjunction of sameness of propositional content and
sameness of attitude (affirmation or denial) toward that content.
The similarity should be characterized in psychological terms, by
keeping on the side of mental acts. One has to say that Twardowski
is less concerned by such a characterization than by establishing
that the similarity that is in need of definition can be achieved in a
very plausible way by virtue of the bodily, cognitive, linguistic and
cultural similarity of the judgers:
If an enduring psychophysical product elicits the mental
product expressed in it, whether successively in one and
the same person, or successively or simultaneously in dif-
ferent persons, then it obviously elicits not just one pro-
duct but as many as there are actions that produce them.
Now, these products will not be completely identical, but
will differ from each other to a greater or lesser extent.
Suffice it to recall how varied are the mental products that
arise in different persons who are affected by the same
picture or sentence. However, insofar as we regard that
psychophysical product as a product that signifies some
sort of mental product, the disparity among the mental
products elicited by it dare not go too far - there must
a group of common attributes in these individual mental
products. And it is precisely these common attributes (in
which these individual products accord) that we ordinarily
regard as the meaning of the psychophysical product, as
the content inherent in it, provided of course that these
common attributes correspond to the intent with which
that psychophysical product was utilized as a sign. This
is also why we say that some sentence arouses ’the same’
thought in different individuals, although strictly speaking
it arouses as many thoughts as there are persons, since
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these thoughts are not identical to each other. But we ab-
stract away from what makes these thoughts differ, and
consider as the thought that comprises the meaning of the
sentence only those of the thought’s constituents that are
in accord with each other and with the corresponding con-
stituents of the thoughts of the person who makes use of
that sentence. Thus, we speak of only a single meaning of
a sign - barring cases of ambiguity - and not of as many
meanings as there are mental products that are aroused,
or capable of being aroused, by the sign in the persons on
whom it acts. Now, a meaning conceived in this manner
is no longer a concrete mental product, byt something at
which we arrive by way of an abstraction performed on
concrete products (op. cit., 127-128).
e) Judgement is not random guess, but cognitive act on the basis on
available evidence. Thus, there is some rationale in the fact that
the judgments which have been performed, once they find an ade-
quate expression in meaningful statements, are able to provoke in
turn other similar judgments. Of course, the intersubjective net-
work of judgments that arise in this way is not to be understood in
a merely causal way: linguistic communication does not amount to
telepathy, and the public expression of my judgments just provides
you with an occasion of following me by making in turn a similar
mental act you are entirely responsible for. Nevertheless, one can
wonder whether the condition, stated by Twardowski, of provoking
the hearer to perform the same judging-act as the speaker is not
a bit too strong to define the meaningfulness of a sentence. For
it is commonsensical that one may very well understand a sentence
without to approve it and grasp what the others think without being
in agreement with them. There is here some risk, to the intentio-
nalist, of an infelicitous confusion between mutual understanding
and mutual agreement. The rival perspective, which considers judg-
ments as individual acts of approbation or denial directed toward
objective, pre-existing propositional contents, is prima facie more
comfortable in dealing with the problem, for it clearly separates the
act of grasping the meaning of the sentence from that of judging
whether the sentence, understood in this way, is right or wrong. To
solve the problem, it is not enough to insist that, in Twardowskian
conception, a sentence can have the meaning it has, while its utte-
rance remains causally inert in some, or even in most, of the people
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who hear or read it. For the point is that meaningfulness is only
equated with potential provocation to act mentally in the same way
as the writer, by which Twardowski means that the utterance should
be at least efficient on some readers. Therefore, these readers, say
the competent readers of the sentence, are just supposed to testify
to its meaningfulness by performing the same mental act as the au-
thor: nothing has been gained in this way, unless one assumes some
intentionalist counterpart of the verificationist theory of meaning,
in posing that an adequate and truly meaningful expression of a
judgment should put its competent reader in a position of being
able, in principle, of recognizing the well-foundedness of the judg-
ment. Twardowski, who never flirted with such extreme verificatio-
nism, canvasses an original way of escaping the difficulty, by putting
forward a notion which is, in some respect, germane to the proposi-
tionalist notion of unasserted content, namely that of unperformed
judgment. In first place, such an inauthentic judgment is, not a
product without producing act - that were a mere contradictio in ad-
jecto indeed -, but an effect that has, as its origin, some unusual or
non-standard source. That happens, for example, in lies, where the
insincere statement may have, and is intended to have, as an effect,
some mental act in the hearer, while it has not its standard source,
namely a comparable act in speaker’s mind. Twardowski calls ’arti-
ficial statements’ (Polish ’sztuczne powiedzenia’; German ’künstliche
Aussagen), or simply ’artifacts’ such products, that are of course
materially undiscernable from the authentic products they imitate:
Such artifacts occur frequently within the realm of psy-
chophysical products. Ample use of them is made, e.g.,
by an actor who assumes a demeanor through which some
feeling is to expressed. As a rule, however, the actor ac-
tually just pretends to have this feeling, so that this de-
meanor, that psychophysical product, does not emerge as
the result of a genuine feeling that ordinarily expresses it-
self in such a demeanor, but as the result of a represen-
tation of a feeling, that is to say ) as the result of a rep-
resented [i.e. imagined] feeling. (...) It is possible to form
artificial, surrogate sentences that are not expressions of
actual judgments, but rather expressions of articifical pro-
ducts that substitute for actual judgments, namely, merely
represented judgments. Hence, the meaning of these arti-
ficial sentences will also not be passed judgments (which
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is to say, actual judgments) but merely represented judg-
ments - that is to say, the representations of judgments
(op. cit., 129-130).
Twardowski gets in this way just what he needs to distinguish be-
tween misunderstanding and disagreement: the mental activity that
a meaningful statement sets in motion in its reader can be limited
to the act of presentation of the judgment in question, without rea-
ching the very repetition of the judgement in her own mind. The lin-
guistic traces of the mental activity of others are potentially unfaith-
ful, in the sense that they may leave the hearer uncertain whether
the activity has been actually performed or merely envisaged, not
to say fainted. One would say, in the traditional vocabulary, that
the force, rather than the content, is specifically vulnerable to com-
municative indeterminacy. Lie is an ever open possibility: there is
no physical feature of the utterance which could be taken as an un-
defeasible warrant that the sentence has been seriously voiced and
that an act of assertion has been actually performed. Expressed
in Twardowskian language, that means that there is no undefeasi-
ble evidence, on the hearer-side, allowing to decide definitely be-
tween the standard interpretation (a judging act has been actually
performed by the speaker) and the artifactual one (she has just
considered the judgment). The undiscernability of the artifactual
and the standard or ’charged’ utterances qua physical products,
as well as the reasonable idea of the supervenience of the psy-
chophysical properties of a product upon its physical properties
(same speech sounds or written traces, same mental activation in a
given hearer/reader at a specified time and place), recommends that
we take, as a condition of the understanding of the utterance, the
weakest requirement that ought to be satisfied either in the stan-
dard or in the artifactual case, namely that we only require, as a
condition of understanding, the performance of an act of presen-
tation of the speaker’s underlying judgment. As it is impossible to
do regularly better, it is enough, to understand in the right way the
linguistic traces of the judicative activity of the others, to form in
oneself a presentation of what is like to judge as they do: as regards
the very replication of this activity, it is, however, not mandatory.
f) Unperformed judgments play sensibly the same rôle, in the inten-
tionalist framework, as unasserted contents do in the propositio-
nalist perspective, insomuch that Twardowski sometimes expresses
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himself as if a judging-act, instead of being the approval or denial
of a single presentation, were the act of accepting or rejecting a pre-
viously unperformed judgment, namely as if a judging-act consisted
in giving, at a second stage, the green light for actual status to un-
performed judgments that were candidates merely contemplated at
a first stage:
[Artifactual sentences] are not psychophysical products that
express actual - that is to say, passed - judgments. They
express merely "represented judgments", and these repre-
sented judgments only substitute for passed, i.e., actual
judgments, just as those sentences substitute for actual
sentences, i.e., ones that express actual judgments. In this
case, a psychophysical artifact expresses a mental artifact.
Preserved surrogate products of this sort present the
most extreme case of making mental products indepen-
dent of the actions owing to which alone they can truly
(actually) exist. Operating with such surrogates in both sci-
ence and everyday life makes it all the easier to slip into
operating with non-surrogate products independently of
the actions producing them, especially since it frequently
happens that actual and surrogate products appear inter-
changeable, as, e.g., when we eventually pass a judgment
which at first we had contemplated with disbelief (niedo-
wierzanie) (op. cit., 130-131).8
On this basis, Twardowski develops a demythologized interpretation
of the Bolzanian notion of ’proposition in itself’ (Satz an sich), which
he conceives, not as a mind-independent entity, but as a judgment
’that has been rendered independent from the action of judging’ (op.
cit., 131, fn61), namely as ’a product that is taken as independent
8Twardowski’s own German version adds that frequent oscillation between per-
forming and not performing, which is characteristic of intellectual life, reinforces
the misleading impression that judgment is approval or denial of mind-independent
prior contents:
Und da wir sowohl in der Wissenschaft als auch im täglichen Leben fort
und fort mit solchen unabhängig erscheinenden stellvertretenden Gebilden
operieren, umso mehr, als wir sehr oft bald das echte, bald das stellvertre-
tenden Gebilde erzeugen, z.B. in dem Falle wo wir zunächst ein Urteil uns
bloß vorstellen, dann es als wahr annehmen also fällen, dann aber wieder an
ihm irre werden und es uns aufs neue bloß vorstellen [Twardowski(1912b),
121]
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from the activity that normally produces it’ [Twardowski(1912b),
122].
To summarize, language participates to the stabilization of the judg-
ments, not by playing an intermediation rôle between individual judgers
and Fregean thoughts enjoying mind-independence and eternity, but
by participating as physical substratum in the process of exchanging,
presenting and remembering individual judgments that eventually ap-
pear as independent from the activity that produced them. At this
stage, unperformed judgments may very well be taken as unasserted
contents in intentionalist clothes. As we will argue now, a deep diffe-
rence, however, separates the two notions as soon as logic appears on
the scene.
2.2 Logical structure
People who have the slightest tincture of formal logic are taken aback
by hearing that Brentano is sometimes credited for a new foundation
of the field. Abruptly expressed, one could say that one is at most in-
debted to him for an analysis of ’It’s raining’, not even extendable, to
his own awoval, to ’Socrates is running’. His attack against the Aris-
totelian thesis of the reducibility of sentences to the subject-predicate
form was not, by large, unprecedented, and many other offensives are
more convincing, as the one that stresses the unlikelihood of the re-
ducibility of every relation to a monadic one. To sum up, Brentano
did not measure up, at any degree, to competition with Frege, who was
definitely the founder of modern logic.
Moreover, few of Brentano’s many followers, admirers, thurifers
and commentators have perceived in the right way, and tried to de-
fend as a plausible line research in logic, his main original idea, namely
that of moving the logical structure from the content of judgment to
the very act of judging, in short of taking judging acts as the very stuff
of logic and of impulsing a dynamic turn for that discipline.
One has to say that the very founding father of contemporary logic,
Frege, had declared a fatwa against any such move. He argued lenghty
that the logical constants ought to be considered as a part of the con-
tent of the judgment, not as a modification of the act, and that they are
contradictory contents rather than opposite judgements. The topical
locus is [Frege(1966)], but he had stated, as early as [Frege(1969)], that
he considered that principle as one of his highest achievements. There
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is little doubt that the this opinion, coming from someone as Frege,
had impressed, not to say intimidated the partisans of intentionalism.
As a matter of fact, the difficulty of moving the logical constants
from contents to acts is unequal. For some of them, e.g. conjunction,
no real difficulty is raised. These constants are tailored for structuring
propositional contents, but they can be acclimated in a smooth and
easy way in the realm of judging acts. For example, conjunction makes
easily sense for mental acts, for ’x judges that A and B’ may be truth-
fully transformed into ’x judges that A and x judges that B’. Not so
for other logical constants, especially for negation: clearly, ’x judges
that Not A’ does not amount to ’x does not judge that A’. It is the
reason why the treatment of the negation focuses the controversy.
To the partisan of propositional content in Frege-style, this problem
is easily overcome by internalizing the denial to the current content,
namely by prefixing it with a negation sign. She is then in a position
of satisfying a certain echangeability requirement, according to which
the denial of A (whatever A could be) ought to be correct if and only if
the acceptance of A is wrong: as Not A is true iff A is false, the denial
of A, once rephrased in the assertion of Not A, is correct iff Not A is
true, namely iff A is false, namely iff the assertion of A is wrong.
The same move is not open to the intentionalist, who cannot in-
voke the mutual play of negation and truth-values at the propositional
content level. As it certainly belongs to her duties to provide a logical
explanation of the link between acceptation and denial - these varieties
of judgment cannot be simply taken as different, unrelated species of
the judging activity -, she has to find her own way on the basis of the
intentionalist conception of truth and evidence. As we will see, the
crucial rôle of unperformed judgments - as distinct of unasserted con-
tents - surfaces at this place.
The intentionalist way out rests on the principle that, to analyse
judgments, the right notion is that of evidence rather that of truth,
which is only a derivative notion in this field. Brentano’s thesis, which
simply equates truth with knowledgability, is this, expressis verbis:
The judgment of someone is correct if she judges in the way,
someone would judge it as being evident.[Brentano(1974),
139]
Thus, one can judge truly by guess, or without adequate evidence, pro-
vided it is possible, to somebody else, to judge in the same way with
evidence. Returning to the problem of indicating a suitable logical link
between affirmation and denial, the question at stake is clearly that
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of defining the conditions for the correctness of these acts. Now, an
asymmetry between the two species immediately appears, which has
no counterpart in the propositionalist framework. Evidence for A enti-
tles to affirm that A, while the lack of such an evidence does not enti-
tles to deny the same. Sketchily expressed, the lack of evidence is not
a variety of evidence, while the lack of truth is a variety of truth-value.
The lack of truth of a propositional content guarantees the correctness
of the assertion of the negated content, but the lack of evidence of an
unperformed judgment is not a sufficient reason to pass the opposite
judgment.
To clarify the point, let us suppose that we have just been informed
that someone has performed such or such judgment, and let us keep
aside any doubt about her performance. As we are not connected with
her by other means than language, we do not know, usually, what kind
of evidence she had to judge in this way. Suppose however, first, that
she has left, not only written traces of her judgment, but also traces
of her evidence for this judgment, for example a formal derivation
of a theorem if it is a question of mathematics. We have firstly to
check the conformity of these traces to some formal standards, just
as if we were evaluating the accordance of whatever physical product
with an agreed level of quality, then, in case of positive verdict, to
try in our turn to perform the mental act of proof that is required,
taking the written by-product as guideline (’real’ proofs are not signs
in the books of mathematics, but mental activities). Let us now take
the most frequent case, when the judgment is communicated without
justification. As it has been performed on the basis of an evidence that
is hidden to us, we cannot do better than to ask ourselves what is like in
general to perform such a judgment, and what is like in general to have
evidence for it. The adequate evidence for a denial cannot be limited
to a negative verdict concerning her presumptive reasons to judge as
she does, or concerning the reasons that present themselves in own
mind. In actual fact, an adequate evidence for denial cannot be weaker
than a negative review of any putative evidence favoring the judgment,
which result can be for example achieved by convincing oneself that
any ’evidence’ of this kind would suffice to establish the opposite of
something very simple we have adequate evidence for. To sum up, a
denial is, to the evident judger, a stratified act, which takes as it basis
the presentation of an unperformed judgment and which transforms
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any putative evidence for it into evidence for another unperformed
judgment, known as incorrect.9
The decision of putting the logical structure on the act-side rather
on the content-side, not only forces the adoption of non-classical se-
mantics, but raises the vexed issue of psychologism. Anyway, Twar-
dowski was convinced that Brentano’s perspective, understood in this
manner, cleared up this infamy in the right way:
The differentiation of mental actions and products, as well
as the differentiation of the various types of mental prod-
ucts, may render no modest service (...) Indeed, a rigor-
ous demarcation of products from actions has already con-
tributed enormously to liberating logic from psychological
accretions. [Twardowski(1912a), 132]
As the respective domains of psychology and logic encompass, accor-
ding to Twardowski (op. cit., 111), the judgment as an act and the
judgment as product, this satisfecit is threatened by a sort of dilemma.
Either one distinguishes really between acts and products, for exam-
ple in considering that judgments as products inhabit a ’third realm’,
distinct of both the mental and the physical domains, and then the
whole doctrine becomes hardly discernable from Dummett’s ’platoni-
cian mythology’; or one distinguishes between them in a merely con-
ceptual manner, as for example the activity of walking may be distin-
guished from its concomitant product, the walk, and then the ’rigorous
demarcation’ between psychology and logic seems to vanish. Actually,
there is few doubt that Twardowski chosed the second option. The
only reservation one can express in this respect has to do with his ap-
parent confidence that classical logic could survive the new, dynamic
perspective opened in this way.
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